This massive flow of humanity crosses multiple national borders, involves every mode of transportation, accounts for billions of dollars paid in fees to smugglers, and describes a fantastically complex economy of suffering and hope. In an effort to get a handle on this human tide, noted muckraker James O’Keefe – known for his hidden camera “gotcha” interviews with abortionists, media executives, progressive nonprofit executives, and other degenerate types – traces the migrant onrush from its source, and seeks to trace the machinery of profit and influence that is conducting it from great removes.

“Line In The Sand,” the resulting documentary, is a remarkable and humane exposition, revealing perspectives and images American audiences have mostly been prevented from seeing. O’Keefe and his intrepid team begin on the U.S. side of the Mexican border, where we witness migrants crossing the border through holes that their guides have cut in a fence that serves as a target as much as a barrier. Infrared cameras show dozens of illegal aliens streaming toward “pick-up” vehicles on the U.S. side while smugglers – presumably cartel members – a few feet away taunt O’Keefe and his group. “What if I were to run up to them right now, what would happen?” O’Keefe asks his guide. “I would highly advise you against that,” he is told, in a classic understatement.

The fact that coyotes and other human traffickers are paid to assist northbound migrants with their passage is no scandal; we all know what their motivations are and why they are doing what they do. But O’Keefe documents multiple examples of U.S. Border Patrol agents standing idly by while illegal aliens cross, virtually under their noses. “Why aren’t you doing anything?” he asks. “Have a good day, guys,” a border agent desultorily responds before driving off in the general direction of the episode. Later, a migrant stands in front of a Border Patrol truck, clearly trying to alert the agents of his intention to surrender, but is studiously ignored until O’Keefe and his team call their attention to him.

There is a kind of sad comedy in the operations of U.S. border security, and O’Keefe is not unsympathetic to the absurd position that border agents have been put in. Trained to defend the national border and to serve as the first line of defense of American soil, these agents have been recommissioned as a perverse Welcome Wagon for illegal aliens, charged with making their undocumented and uninvited entrance to the United States as commodious as possible.

Looking to get deeper into the heart of this migratory avalanche, O’Keefe went deep into Mexico, to the city of Irapuato, about 150 miles northwest of Mexico City. Irapuato is a popular railway junction where thousands of migrants climb aboard “La Bestia,” or “The Beast,” a cargo train that chugs northward toward the United States. In the film’s most remarkable footage, O’Keefe and his team join with migrants, mostly from South and Central America, to ride The Beast, also known as “el Tren del Muerto,” or the Train of Death. O’Keefe talks to the migrants without condescension, asking them their destinations and what they plan to do when they get there, and their concerns about the perilous nature of the journey. We see the film crew race to jump on a moving train and clamber on top to sit in a pile of coal; O’Keefe is shocked at how truly dangerous this small element of the trip is and sympathizes with the migrants’ difficult choices. These scenes are among the film’s most affecting, along with the crew’s random encounter with a little girl who had just crossed the border after journeying from Guatemala by herself. There is a human dimension to illegal immigration, and O’Keefe does not ignore it.

However, there is also an impersonal dimension to this massive population transfer, and O’Keefe determinedly aims to uncover it – to put a face to the institutions and administrators that benefit from the rough injection of millions of people into American society. From government agents to bus companies to nonprofit resettlement groups to private contractors running huge, walled compounds housing thousands of children, O’Keefe doggedly tries to penetrate the mechanics of a system that resolutely hides itself behind a screen of silence, usually in the name of “safety” and “privacy.”

Some of the film’s more comical moments pertain to these segments, such as when the team follows some just-arrived Chinese migrants in San Diego to an employment agency, where other Chinese aliens, already in the country for several months, complain that it’s much harder to live in the United States than they had imagined. O’Keefe tries to sniff out a connection between the owner of the agency and more powerful actors, but it emerges that there really isn’t much going on; in fact, the owner asks O’Keefe if he knows of a way to apply for government grants.

Elsewhere, O’Keefe tries to get information about the operations of several huge residential centers for unaccompanied minors and tries to spin their refusal to give him access to the centers or submit to interviews as evidence of the existence of vast, government-funded child sex trafficking networks. But it seems more likely, though no less troubling, that the open borders policy of the last four years has created a tremendous humanitarian crisis of alien children roaming the continent by themselves, and the government is probably trying to keep them from becoming prey to sex traffickers while they sort out where to send them. Though O’Keefe does not uncover a salacious network of child predators, his vigorous pursuit of the truth does reveal the existence of a large, shadowy, government-funded, and lucrative system of child “welfare.”

So, “Line In The Sand” is correct in the larger sense that billions of dollars are being spent managing this human flow, and many people are getting rich off of it. The last thing these parasitical administrators of the nonprofit industrial complex want is for the border to close. O’Keefe does a great job of capturing in real time the corruption of a local New York City nonprofit called La Jornada, whose leader, Pedro Rodriguez, evidently perpetrates fraud, demanding fees for services that the city provides for free. O’Keefe also sends a Spanish-speaking reporter undercover into the Roosevelt Hotel, New York City’s main processing center for newly-arrived migrants, which offers him free housing, medical care, and even airplane tickets, even though the reporter explains that he has no identification of any sort. How, O’Keefe asks, in our post 9/11 security-obsessed era, are we to make sense of a system that admits millions of unvetted foreigners into the country, and then offers to fly them anywhere they care to go?

“Line In The Sand” is rough in parts, but intentionally so. Its subject is so sprawling and tangled that a neat and clean representation would be a lie. Even with a nine-figure budget – which this film assuredly did not have – a documentary about the border and the 30 million-footed human swarm that has crossed it would be messy and incomplete. But James O’Keefe and his small team have done something remarkable. They have taken on the decade’s biggest story, given it form, and preserved the humanity of its subjects. It is worth watching.

Seth Barron is a writer in New York and author of the forthcoming “Weaponized from Humanix.”

People who make the most money are builders. Creating something new out of nothing, zero-to-one, is the hardest thing there is to do. So, society rewards those who do it best. There are all sorts of builders of course. And the most highly compensated are those who build things that no one has ever dreamt of, or perhaps not ever thought possible. Things which the builder had to imagine would someday be in high demand if only it could be brought to market. Henry Ford dreamt of a Model T. Steve Jobs imagined an iPhone. Musk aspires to Mars.

Investors make less than builders because investing is easier, and moving money provides less value to society. There are all sorts of investors. Naturally, the highest paid are builders of investment firms. Griffin. Schwartzman. Dalio. Buffet’s extreme wealth is an outlier, but he’s been building Berkshire since 1965, compounding longer than any living entrepreneur. Investors generally make money like builders do. Some invest in outcomes no one thought possible. Most buy things they imagine will soon be in high demand.

The West confiscated $300bln of Russian assets in the days following its Feb 2022 Ukraine invasion. It didn’t take a wild imagination to picture a world where every sovereign nation that had stored its national wealth in assets controlled by western nations would seek an alternative. Gold seemed a good bet. But Powell started his historic rate hike cycle in March of 2022, which pushed the gold price down 20% – investing may be easier than building, but that doesn’t mean it’s easy. Buyers prevailed in time, and gold is now 25% higher than pre-invasion.

Investors could have bought Bitcoin instead of gold. Its price fell from $40k pre-invasion to $16k at the FTX lows and now trades $100k. Someone is clearly buying. And like many reflexive bull markets, higher prices create more positives. Bitcoin has quite clearly come to be recognized as an alternative to gold and has deepened what is now the most secure network ever built by humans. Ethereum performance has improved by orders of magnitude, growing faster, cheaper, more secure, versatile. Through the vicious cycle, crypto builders kept building.

The election marked a shift in US policy away from outward hostility toward the crypto industry. It took little imagination to picture a world where countless uninvested individuals and institutions would finally recognize the asset class and include it in their portfolios. Markets repriced accordingly. But it is also not so hard to imagine other profoundly different futures which as recently as five weeks ago most investors barely considered. This new future will unfold with these technologies now able to really scale. And this curve will steepen.

Every major global financial institution must now recognize that its entire trading, settlement, custody and risk infrastructure will likely shift to blockchain rails in the decade to come. Every bank, broker, custodian, exchange, asset manager, and payments provider must imagine a future where its business will be rebuilt on a new platform. They’ll either do it themselves, find an infrastructure partner, or lose to a competitor. It’s not hard to imagine a world where demand for crypto builders and infrastructure providers/partners will be extraordinary.

As Statista’s Anna Fleck reports, the topic has been reignited by the release of a new book titled The Anxious Generation, by New York University social psychologist Jonathan Haidt, who links the rise in mental health illness directly to the proliferation of social networks and smartphones.

While Haidt writes that social media and smartphones are not the only causes of the mental health epidemic seen in several countries, he points to how such technologies are hindering children’s healthy development by reducing their time spent playing with friends in real life, eating into time for sleeping, as well as corroding their self esteem. Even children who do not use social media are struggling, he argues, due to the changes brought about to social life. Critics say, however, that correlation is not the same as causation and that the data does not show a complete picture.

As the following chart shows, the share of U.S. 12-17 year olds having experienced a depressive episode in the past year has risen from 7.9 percent in 2006 to 18.1 percent in 2023.

While the figure has come down from the pandemic high of 20.1 percent in 2021, it is still above that of 2019 and 2020.

This is according to data from the U.S. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. The source classifies a major depressive episode in the past 12 months if a respondent has had at least one period of two weeks or longer when they felt depressed or lost interest or pleasure in daily activities for most of the day nearly every day. Depressive symptoms include problems with sleeping, eating, energy, concentration, self-worth, or having recurrent thoughts of death or recurrent suicidal ideation.

The share of teens who had reported a major depressive episode was particularly high among Multiracial (24.4 percent) respondents in 2023, followed by white adolescents (19.6), Asian (13.7 percent) and Black teens (13.3 percent).

There was insufficient data for calculating the Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander teenagers.

Dr. Shelton engages these questions in the context of academic debates, but she also uses the lens of rational economic planning to evaluate how the monetary system contributes to or detracts from economic growth. At the end of the day, the case for sound money rests on the claim that it will generate more stable and greater long-run economic prosperity. Dr. Shelton believes sound money will do just that. But what would such a sound money regime look like?

Although Dr. Shelton would prefer a system along the lines of a classical gold standard, she would probably be content with other monetary systems that dramatically reduced the discretion of policymakers. The real problem with our current monetary regime is not primarily technical. It is behavioral. Because public officials have strong incentives to inflate the currency, bail out various corporations, and underwrite extensive government borrowing, they do a poor job conserving the value of fiat currency or providing a predictable stable system of interest rates, credit, liquidity, etc.

In the first couple chapters of “Good as Gold,” Dr. Shelton takes the Federal Reserve to task. The wide discretion Fed officials can exercise makes monetary policy unpredictable. Although Fed officials argue that their decisions are countercyclical, that may not always be the case. As Milton Friedman famously noted, the effects of monetary policy decisions have “long and variable” lags. Despite claims to being “data-driven,” Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decisions remain unpredictable. Data can change rapidly and unpredictably, which can make policy change rapid and unpredictable too.

Another problem is that the “data-driven” mantra invokes the assumption that the data always clearly indicate what ought to be done. In fact, this is rarely the case. Not only do a wide variety of inflation measures exist, but there are also a wide range of time intervals over which to compare inflation trends. But that’s not the worst of it!

Employment, unemployment, GDP, and a host of other economic numbers suggest different things are going on in the economy. Retailers expect strong record spending this holiday season while the N.Y. Fed just released a study where the number of people reporting concern about their ability to make debt payments hit its highest level since 2020. How to weigh these various factors is far from clear.

Another problem with Fed policy is the rapid change in its interest rate targets. Three years ago, the short-run interest rate was ~.5 percent. Within two years it was over 5 percent. That rapid change created many issues in the economy, only some of which we have recognized. The rate-hike cycle created significant turmoil in the banking industry with Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank failing entirely while many large regional banks shrank or were enfolded into larger national banks.

The commercial real estate market has also been upended. While the owners of office buildings were already facing strong headwinds from the pandemic’s normalization of remote work, the Fed delivered a one-two punch when it raised interest rates. Most large commercial real estate investors use variable rate debt to finance their portfolios—which means the interest rate they pay moves with the market. Adding a couple percentage points to one’s debt rapidly changes the viability of a venture. In addition to higher debt-servicing costs, commercial real estate investors saw the market value of their holdings decline precipitously as buyers disappeared, financing costs rose, and future potential cash flows were more heavily discounted.

The previous rate-hike cycle in 2006 and 2007 preceded a major recession and financial crisis. Even as the Fed creates disruptions in markets, it has also overseen the relentless decline in the value of the dollar—ironically in the name of pursuing their mandate to maintain price stability. A dollar in 2024 is worth what a quarter was in 1980 and what a dime was in 1965. And a 2024 dollar is worth about what a penny was worth in 1900.

This downward march in the value of the dollar creates problems.

It drives up asset prices, favoring those who have investment savvy while eating away at the value of people’s savings and undermining the prosperity of those on fixed incomes. The steady fall of the dollar also distorts price calculations and expectations.

I’ve argued elsewhere that the Fed has been a prime culprit in boosting housing prices and, as a result, creating a “transitional gains trap” where homeowners with significant equity, juiced in large part by easy money, have organized to protect their equity by putting up local legal barriers to building new housing.

But “Good as Gold” includes much more than criticism of the Fed. Dr. Shelton points out that unstable money and exchange rates create costs to doing business. International firms must devote time, energy, and money to protect themselves from erratic fluctuations in currency exchange rates. Creating these “hedges” to protect their profitability from exchange-rate risk necessitates additional classes of assets and asset traders—contributing to greater “financialization” of the economy. While the services being offered create real value for corporations, they come at a price and would not be needed under more stable monetary arrangements.

Besides the frictions and costs that unstable money introduces into day-to-day business operations, it also creates long-term consequences when it comes to investing. If certain exchange rates can move 15 percent, 30 percent, or more in a single year, Dr. Shelton asks, then how can investors rationally allocate capital based on real factors and comparative advantage? The structure and mix of capital investment we currently have across countries and within the same country looks very different than it would in a world of stable money.

Dr. Shelton makes this point indirectly in a fascinating chapter about the monetary debate between Milton Friedman and Robert Mundell. Both were staunch advocates of free markets, but they differed in what monetary regime they thought best. Friedman argued in favor of freely floating exchange rates set by market participants. In this world, governments would feel pressure from markets, in the form of capital outflows, if they engaged in domestic monetary policy shenanigans. Mundell, on the other hand, favored more stability in exchange rates that would require domestic prices to adapt to changes in trade and capital flows. Friedman and Mundell both agreed, however, that government officials and central bankers should have very little discretion in how they managed a country’s monetary system.

In a later chapter, Shelton offers the problem of “currency manipulation” as a reason for implementing a sound money regime. Her argument basically asserts that countries that actively depreciate or weaken their domestic currency experience short-run benefits (in the form of more competitive exports) and long-term costs (in the form of inflation and capital outflows). Other countries, however, feel short-run pain as their exports decline and their factories shut down—even though they also receive cheaper goods and reallocate much of the displaced labor and capital. I find this line of reasoning a bit curious.

Shelton rightly champions free trade and argues that it works best when countries do not artificially manipulate the value of their currencies. No objection here. But I am not convinced that a sound money regime, even a gold standard, would change other countries’ incentives to devalue their currency. Gold convertibility of one currency does not prevent the issuer of a different fiat currency from issuing large amounts of that fiat currency to reduce the relative price of its exports.

I suppose one could argue (and Dr. Shelton does) that currency manipulation becomes easier to discern because currencies will be valued in terms of a fixed standard (gold), rather than in terms of another fluctuating fiat currency. For example, the price of gold in terms of dollars increased by 77 percent from May 2014 to May 2024.

The currencies of the largest trade partners with the United States lost far more value relative to gold in that period: Euros (129 percent), Mexican Peso (131 percent), Canadian dollar (122 percent), Chinese yuan (105 percent), and Japanese yen (165 percent). But that probably matters relatively little to the devaluing regime. Using gold as a benchmark might reveal relative changes in the value of currencies better. It could also defuse the language of “currency manipulation.”

Instead of attributing motives to foreign central bankers, policy makers could set relatively straight-forward criteria for when another country’s currency declines in a distortive way. Shelton suggests that some level of tariffs should be imposed in response to another country’s currency devaluation to offset the monetary distortion to international trade. This idea may not be crazy from a purely technical standpoint, yet I would hesitate to recommend it because of the likely distortions and co-opting of such policies by special interests. I also question whether the costs of not imposing tariffs on depreciating currencies is as high as Dr. Shelton believes.

Sound money advocates like Shelton must explain how we could get to a sound money regime. On the one hand, advocating a gold standard seems archaic and implausible. On the other hand, it would not be technically difficult to implement. And, in fact, given the dominance of the U.S. dollar, if another major currency, such as the Euro, also chose to move back to gold redeemability, it is not hard to imagine other major currencies (Yen, Yuan, Pound, etc.) following suit. The political difficulty, of course, is getting the United States to take the first step and then getting the EU to follow suit.

The odds of successful reform are highest when pursuing the easiest path to transition the current system to a sound monetary regime. Abolishing the Federal Reserve is not on that path. So tying dollars back to gold using the Fed makes more sense than moving back to a pre-Fed world. Similarly, constraining the FOMC seems far more plausible than abolishing it.

It may be worth raising a few other important secondary questions. At what price will the currency be convertible into gold? Dr. Shelton has suggested that incorporating a gold clause in Treasury bonds could be a good method for discovering the right price of convertibility. In fact, putting gold convertibility into government bond contracts may be sufficient, in and of itself, to tie dollars back to gold.

Afterall, depreciation of dollars would create consequences for the federal government and the Federal Reserve, the very institutions primarily responsible for managing the dollar and maintaining the monetary system. Shelton also makes the important point that currency should be seen as being like a weight or measure—something standardized for the public to use. It should not be viewed as a policy instrument or lever for managing the economy. This simple point rarely arises in modern commentary on the Fed and on monetary policy—yet it has deep legal and historical roots in the American founding and beyond.

Another benefit of moving to gold redeemability for U.S. bonds is that it utilizes U.S. gold reserves more effectively. Currently, the United States is the largest holder of gold in the world. But ironically, that gold is severely undervalued on the government’s ledger. Its book value is less than two percent of its market value (i.e., on the ledger the gold is valued at less than $50/oz when its market value is over $2700/oz). Offering gold redeemability might also open up the option for extremely long-dated debt (50 years or more) and lower interest rates because the most significant risk to lending to the federal government, the devaluation of future dollars, has been taken off the table.

The likely benefits of such bonds are so significant that it may seem surprising that they have not been implemented. The problem, of course, is that this form of bond would reveal the man behind the curtain. It would show that government officials can and do play fast and loose with the dollar and with the U.S. financial system to enable themselves and their friends a free hand to borrow and spend, and to actively “manage” the economy.

Dr. Shelton’s proposed changes will be vigorously resisted by those who benefit from the existing status quo—large commercial banks and financial institutions, Federal Reserve officials and bureaucrats, politicians and regulators—everyone who benefits from the Fed’s tendency to loose monetary policy. Still advocates of freedom and prosperity should continue to make the arguments and offer proposals for moving to a sound monetary regime.

And that is exactly what Dr. Shelton does in “Good as Gold.”